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In “World Poverty and Individual Freedom” (WPIF) I argue that  the global order – because it  is  coercive – is  
obligated to do what it can to ensure that its subjects are capable of autonomously agreeing to its rule. This requires  
helping them meet their basic needs. In “World Poverty and Not Respecting Individual Freedom Enough” Jorn 
Sonderholm asserts that this argument is invalid and unsound, in part, because it is too demanding. This article 
explains why Sonderholm’s critique is mistaken and misses the main point of WPIF’s argument. It also explains why 
WPIF is  important  --  it  can address  some of  those  most  resistant  to  significant  obligations of  global  justice  - 
libertarians, actual consent theorists, and statists. 
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COERCION, LEGITIMACY, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM
I. INTRODUCTION
In “World Poverty and Individual Freedom” (henceforth WPIF) I present an argument that goes roughly as 
follows:
(1) There is a coercive global institutional system. 
(2) Because this system deeply impacts the lives of individuals and communities in morally significant ways, we are 
obligated to ensure that it is legitimate. 
(3) For any coercive institutional system to be even minimally legitimate, as many of those subject to the system as  
possible must be able to autonomously agree to live under it. 
(4) For most people to be able to autonomously agree to live under an institutional system, they must be able to  
preserve the integrity of their body and mind. 
(5) Since it is not possible to tell which individuals will be capable of autonomously agreeing to live under an 
institutional system without being able to preserve this integrity, legitimate institutional systems must enable all of 
their subjects to do so. 
(6) The ability to preserve the integrity of one’s body and mind requires that one is able to meet one’s basic needs. 
(C) So we are, prima facie, obligated to ensure that the global institutional system enables all people to meet their  
basic needs.
In “World Poverty and Not Respecting Individual Freedom Enough” Jorn Sonderholm claims that this argument is 
both invalid and unsound.i This article will suggest that Sonderholm is mistaken because his critique misses the main 
point of WPIF’s argument.ii In doing so, this paper will primarily address Sonderholm’s concerns about the truth of 
the premises of WPIF’s argument. It will not focus on Sonderholm’s worries about validity as he acknowledges that 
the summary above of WPIF’s key claims is just intended to provide a rough sketch of its argument and can be filled 
in.iii
II. CRITIQUE: WPIF NEGLECTS THE IMPORTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY
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Sonderholm’s main critique is that the fifth premise of WPIF’s argument is false. iv Recall this premise: 
Since  it  is  not  possible  to  tell  which  individuals  will  be  capable  of  autonomously  agreeing  to  live  under  an  
institutional system without being able to preserve the integrity of their bodies and minds, legitimate institutional 
systems must enable all of their subjects to do so. Sonderholm provides three primary reasons to think this premise 
is false. First, he says that on the requisite account of basic needs it is “not only the poor in the developing world 
who do not have their basic needs met.”v He believes that it is not plausible that we have to help relatively affluent 
people secure things like very expensive medical care even if they cannot secure what they need on their own (and it  
is possible to help them). Second, he makes the related point that helping people secure all the medical care they 
need “is bound to be extremely expensive for those who will have to bear the financial costs.” vi Finally, he says 
people may be responsible for their poverty and, so, legitimate (coercive) institutions may have no obligation to 
enable them to meet their basic needs.
Sonderholm allows that  sometimes moral  duties can be very demanding (e.g.  he says we cannot hold 
slaves, even if we will suffer significantly in refusing to do so). Nevertheless, Sonderholm claims, it is only when 
one  violates  a  negative  right  that  one  has  an  obligation  to  bear  such  costs.  The global  order,  he  says,  is  not  
responsible for the fact that many people are sick, so it has no responsibility to them. 
Sonderholm says that I cannot simply endorse the implications of WPIF’s argument as he lays them out  
since I am committed to respecting individual freedom.vii However, he recognizes that some cosmopolitan liberals 
will  do  so.  Sonderholm  just  believes  that  providing  (at  least  expensive)  aid  requires  some  to  sacrifice  their 
(economic) freedom for  others.  He says this is  inconsistent  with my claim that  “no one should be required to  
sacrifice her freedom for others.”viii 
III. RESPONSE: COERCION VS. HARM OR CAUSATION
It  is  precisely because the global order is  violating people’s negative rights – their freedom – that  the  
argument in WPIF works. Sonderholm fails to recognize the main reason for WPIF’s conclusion -- that the global  
order is coercing people. WPIF does not rely on the claim that the global order is harming anyone or causing their 
poverty.ix Hence, much of Sonderholm’s criticism of the idea that the global order is “playing a causally important 
role in bringing it about that so many people among the global poor suffer from ill-health” simply misses the mark.x 
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WPIF’s  argument is  novel  and important,  in part,  because it  does not contend that  the global order  is 
harming anyone or causing their poverty. It does not just reiterate standard cosmopolitan arguments for significant  
obligations to the global poor.xi Of course, causal/harm-based arguments may provide independent reasons for aiding 
the poor. There may also be other good arguments for protecting and promoting individuals’ basic interests and  
autonomy.xii Still, WPIF’s argument is important because it can address even some of those who do not accept such 
arguments.xiii
The claim that the global order is doing something to people that requires legitimation – coercing them – is 
also the reason that the argument respects individual freedom. It is not just because people need help that the global  
order  (and  those  of  us  supporting  and  upholding  it)  must  aid  the  poor  (and  others  who  require  assistance  to 
autonomously agree to live under it). It is because this order is responsible for doing something to people that can 
only be justified if, at a minimum, those subject to its rules have the capacities they need to autonomously agree to  
live under it.  This  often requires  providing the necessary aid (even to relatively affluent)  people who will  not  
otherwise meet their most basic needs. Aid is required even if it is expensive and those receiving aid are lazy or  
stupid and even if the global order did not cause their problems. The reason is this: Coercing even the stupid or lazy  
requires justification. People should at least be able to dissent from, or consent to, coercive rule.xiv
Perhaps holding that we are sometimes obligated to provide, even expensive, aid to some relatively affluent 
people who are responsible for their plights, amounts to “biting” Sonderholm’s “bullets.”xv If so, however, this is 
something  all  welfare  liberals  will  enthusiastically  endorse  (at  least  within  states).  The  next  section  suggests,  
however, that this argument can still address some of those most concerned about individual freedom – libertarians 
and actual consent theorists – it does not require denying the importance of economic freedom. It also explains how 
WPIF’s  argument  poses  a  challenge  to  statists  who  deny  its  conclusion  because  they  do  not  think  there  are 
significant obligations of properly global legitimacy or justice.
IV. WPIF’S IMPORT: ADDRESSING LIBERTARIANS, ACTUAL CONSENT THEORISTS, AND 
STATISTS
WPIF’s  argument  is  important,  in  part,  because  it  can  address  (right)  libertarians  (henceforth,  simply 
libertarians)  and  actual  consent  theorists.xvi There  is  a  nice  argument  in  the  debate  between  libertarians  and 
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anarchists that suggests libertarians should be actual consent theorists.xvii If coercive rule requires justification by 
free consent, it should follow fairly quickly that people should be able to autonomously agree to live under the 
global order.xviii So, if no one else is ensuring that those subject to this order can secure the things they need to 
consent, the global order must provide the requisite assistance. At least this is so if libertarians 1. maintain their  
commitment to a state with the traditional kind of territorial integrity (they do not think states must cede territory to  
the non-autonomous as anarchists do) and 2. hold that even those who are only potentially autonomous retain their  
basic libertarian rights.xix Libertarians may maintain that it is acceptable to threaten (or otherwise coerce) merely 
potentially autonomous people to protect their autonomy or interests.xx Still, as long as they do not violate others’ 
rights, these people retain their rights (e.g. to protect their property insofar as possible). 
WPIF also poses a challenge to the coherence of some common libertarian commitments and this explains 
why I can maintain that  “no one should be required to sacrifice her  freedom for  others.” xxi Like most liberals, 
libertarians  believe  economic  freedom is  incredibly important.  Poor  people  (especially women)  are  often  poor 
because they are denied property rights. Moreover,  property and other economic rights are important  for many 
things besides escaping poverty. Part of the problem for libertarians, however, is this: Libertarians often hold that  
property rights  are absolute and inviolable so taxation to  do things like protect  basic needs is  unjustifiable.  If  
ensuring that everyone can meet their basic needs requires violating (libertarian) economic rights, their position may 
be incoherent.xxii Let me put the point another way. Suppose Sonderholm and I are both right that “no one should be 
required to sacrifice her freedom for others.”xxiii If the version of WPIF’s argument sketched above is correct, we are 
obligated to  protect  individuals’ freedom to dissent from, or  consent  to,  coercive rule if  we insist  on coercing  
them.xxiv But if this requires taxation to protect basic needs,  not all libertarian obligations (to respect and protect 
freedom) are clearly compatible.xxv Some may have to sacrifice (or to be made to sacrifice) some of their important 
libertarian freedoms for others. So  libertarians  have a problem. It may be better to maintain a much less robust 
account of property rights (and corresponding freedoms) that allows for the necessary taxation. At least libertarians 
may have to endorse some tradeoffs between protecting (libertarian) economic freedom and ensuring that people are 
free to dissent from, or consent to, coercive rule. In either case, I might summarize WPIF’s point for libertarians this  
way: Libertarians agree that  “no one should be required to sacrifice her freedom for others.”xxvi WPIF’s argument 
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shows that it is precisely to protect individual freedom that there are significant obligations to the global poor. If this  
causes problems for libertarians, that is just too bad for them.
WPIF’s argument is also important, however,  because it  can address statists who are deeply concerned 
about  coercion  within  a  state  but  who do  not  believe  there  are  any significant  obligations  of  properly global 
legitimacy or justice. These people may hold that we are obligated to help everyone secure autonomy but they do 
not believe this is required by legitimacy or justice.xxvii This is not so if WPIF is correct, however. Just like states, the 
global order must be justified in coercing people. If this justification is of a traditional contractualist (or perhaps 
liberalxxviii) sort then, it should follow that as many of those subject to the global institutional system as possible must  
be able to autonomously agree to live under it. It is on this claim that WPIF’s argument really hangs (this claim is  
embodied in the conjunction of premise 5 and premise 3). At least it should be the most contentious philosophical 
thesis in the article. Others have, subsequently, pushed this point as well but I also defend it at much greater length  
in several longer papers (cited in WPIF) and my book Globalization and Global Justice.xxix 
V. CONCLUSION
In WPIF I argue that the global order – because it is coercive – is obligated to do what it can to ensure that  
its subjects are capable of autonomously agreeing to, or dissent from, its rule. xxx This requires helping them meet 
their  basic  needs.  Sonderholm  believes  that  this  argument  is  invalid  and  unsound,  in  part,  because  it  is  too  
demanding.xxxi Nevertheless, it can easily be made valid and when it is, there is some reason to believe it is sound.  
Since negative rights violations can yield demanding obligations, this is not surprising. The argument’s main point  
did, however, require some emphasis and clarification. WPIF is important because it can address some of those most  
resistant to significant obligations of global justice - libertarians, actual consent theorists, and statists. It may even 
pose a challenge to the coherence of libertarian or actual consent theories. If enabling people to secure the freedom 
they need to consent to coercion requires taxation, some may have to sacrifice their (libertarian economic) freedom. 
On non-libertarian theories, however, there is little reason to believe that anyone will have to “sacrifice her freedom  
for others.”xxxii Moreover, it is precisely to protect individual freedom that there are significant obligations to aid.xxxiii
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i Sonderholm says this argument is invalid for two reasons. First, the linking premises that would make the argument valid 
are not included in the summary that appears at the start of the paper. Second, the “prima facie” qualification that appears in  
the conclusion is not included in any of the premises. Once the linking premises are added, however, it is possible to derive  
the qualified version of the argument straightforwardly from the unqualified version. The prima facie exception in the  
conclusion was only meant in the traditional way. If it is impossible for the global order to help someone meet their basic  
needs, or another strong moral requirement is in conflict with the one defended in WPIF, we may not be obligated to ensure 
that the global institutional system enables all people to meet their basic needs. Further ethical reflection is required to  
arrive at an all things considered conclusion about what to do. I do not believe either of these qualifications goes to the heart 
of Sonderholm’s main critique however. For discussion, see: Nicole Hassoun, Globalization and Global Justice: Shrinking  
Distance, Expanding Obligations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012a). Also see: Nicole Hassoun, “Freedom 
and Autonomy,” in  New Waves in Global Justice,  ed.  Thom Brooks (Hampshire and New York: Palgrave MacMillion, 
forthcoming). Finally, see: Nicole Hassoun, “Coercion, Legitimacy, and Global Justice.” Carnegie Mellon Working Paper. 
2012b.  Available  at:  http://www.hss.cmu.edu/philosophy/hassoun/faculty-hassoun.php (the  later  were  originally cited  in 
WPIF as Hassoun, 2008a and b). While one might try to use the prima facie qualification to avoid Sonderholm’s criticisms,  
I do not take that line in what follows. So, I believe we can safely set aside his concern that the “prima facie” qualification  
that  appears  in  WPIF’s  conclusion is  not  included  in  any of  the premises.  I  discuss  Sonderholm’s  concern  about  the 
argument’s missing premises in subsequent notes.
ii Before  doing  so,  it  is  worth  noting  three  things  up  front.  First,  that  (5)  is  supposed  to  state  something  like  what  
Sonderholm calls 5*. That is, filling in the elliptical phrase at the end of this premise we get: Since it is not possible to tell  
which individuals will be  capable of autonomously agreeing to live under an institutional system without being able to 
preserve this integrity, legitimate institutional systems must enable all of their subjects to preserve this  capability. That is, 
the  premise  suggests  that  the  global  order  has  to  ensure  people  have  a  capability.  This  may  do  little  to  alleviate 
Sonderholm’s concern about responsibility since people may be responsible for the fact that they lack a capability. Noting  
the correct interpretation of this premise may, however, help resolve Sonderholm’s question about whether the things I say 
about  autonomy are  consistent.  Jorn  Sonderholm,  “World  Poverty  and  Not  Respecting  Individual  Freedom Enough.” 
Journal of  Philosophical  Research 36 (2011):  215, nt.  4.  Those who find it  compelling, however,  can also accept the 
stronger conclusion that the global order must ensure that people actually secure integrity of body and mind. I defend a  
version of the stronger conclusion in: Hassoun, 2012a and Hassoun, 2012b. Second, a note on autonomy that addresses a 
minor worry Sonderholm expressed elsewhere: The reason it may be strictly impossible to make someone autonomous is 
that we cannot always make people reason or plan, though we can often provide the food, water, and education etc. that they 
need to do so. On the necessary linking premises see the next note. Finally, some discussion of “enabling” and “ensuring” is  
important for understanding my argument. Interested readers can also refer to my other work for further explication.
iii Consider a different way of expressing the main point of the argument that should make it clear that the argument is valid:
a) The global institutional system is coercive and impacts the lives of individuals and communities in morally significant 
ways.
b)  Since  the  global  institutional  system is  coercive  and  impacts  the  lives  of  individuals  and  communities  in  morally 
significant ways, the global institutional system must be legitimate.
c) The global institutional system must be legitimate. (from a and b)
d) For the global institutional system to be legitimate, as many of those subject to the system as possible must be able to  
autonomously agree to live under it. 
e) For as many of those subject to the global institutional system as possible to be able to autonomously agree to live under  
an  institutional  system,  they  must  be  able  to  preserve  the  integrity  of  their  body  and  mind.
f) For the global institutional system to be legitimate, as many of those subject to the system as possible must be able to  
preserve the integrity of their body and mind. (from d and e)
g) If, for the global institutional system to be legitimate, as many of those subject to the system as possible must be able to  
preserve  the  integrity  of  their  body and  mind  then  if  it  is  not  possible  to  tell  which  individuals  will  be  capable  of  
autonomously agreeing to live under an institutional system without being able to preserve the integrity of their body and 
mind then, for the global institutional system to be legitimate, it must enable as many of its subjects as possible to preserve 
the integrity of their body and mind.
h) It is not possible to tell which individuals will be capable of autonomously agreeing to live under an institutional system 
without being able to preserve the integrity of their body and mind.
i) For the global institutional system to be legitimate, it must enable as many of its subjects as possible to preserve the  
integrity of their body and mind. (from f, g, and h)
j) For anyone to preserve the integrity of their body and mind, they must be able to meet their basic needs.
k) For the global institutional system to be legitimate it must enable as many of its subjects as possible meet their basic  
needs. (from i and j)
l) If the coercive global institutional system must be legitimate and this requires that it enable as many of its subjects as  
possible to meet their basic needs, the global institutional system must enable these people to do so.
:. So, the global institutional system must enable these people meet their basic needs. (from c and l)
*It also follows quickly that the global institutional system must (prima facie) enable as many people as possible to meet 
their basic needs. This alternate conclusion is just a weakening of the stronger version. 
*Finally, note that I omit here any mention of who bears responsibility for the requisite institutional change, although the  
conclusion of WPIF was originally put this way: “we are,  prima facie, obligated to ensure that the global institutional  
system enables people to meet their basic needs.” I omit this addition here only because it is not pertinent to addressing  
Sonderholm’s critique and the paper’s main point is not to set out or defend an account of responsibility for institutional 
change. Though, as noted in WPIF, who is responsible for bringing about the requisite institutional changes will depend, in  
part, on what changes are required and it is plausible that the relatively affluent members of the world’s population who 
inaugurate, uphold, or are in a position to change the global institutional system bear some responsibility for doing so.
iv
 He frames his argument as a modus ponens - modus tollens move denying WPIF’s conclusion (the consequent of premise 5  
in  combination with premise 6).  Jorn Sonderholm, “World  Poverty and Not  Respecting Individual  Freedom Enough.” 
Journal  of  Philosophical  Research 36  (2011):  215,  nt.  5.  This,  I  believe,  is  not  the  most  charitable  construal  of 
Sonderholm’s main point. He provides reasons for denying WPIF’s conclusion – he says it is too demanding in various  
ways. The problem is that his argument does not address the reasons given in WPIF for accepting the claims he denies and 
Sonderholm provides little defense of the claim that an argument should not be so demanding.
v
 Jorn Sonderholm, “World Poverty and Not Respecting Individual Freedom Enough.” Journal of Philosophical Research 36 
(2011): 211. Sonderholm also worries that I do not provide a full account of the basic needs at issue for this argument. The  
requisite account must just  specify that  people need whatever will enable them to autonomously consent to the global 
institutional  system’s  rule.  I  have,  however,  defended much more  robust  accounts  of  basic  needs  elsewhere.  See,  for  
instance:  Nicole Hassoun,  “Basic Needs,”  Justice in a Complex World.  Global Economy and International Aid,  Paulo 
Barcelos and Gabriele De Angelis eds., (Berlin: de Gruyter Press, forthcoming). 
vi
 Jorn Sonderholm, “World Poverty and Not Respecting Individual Freedom Enough.” Journal of Philosophical Research 36 
(2011): 212.
vii
 Jorn Sonderholm, “World Poverty and Not Respecting Individual Freedom Enough.” Journal of Philosophical Research 36 
(2011): 213. Sonderholm might reply that: “In order to underpin the suggestion that the current global institutional system is 
illegitimate, it must be established that a substantial amount of people with unmet basic needs are in this position,  not 
because  of  intentional  acts  of  their  own  or  because  of  features  of  the  domestic/regional  political  institutions  and/or  
religious/cultural traditions to which they are subject or because of negative effects of trade policies unilaterally enacted by  
individual nation states, but because the global institutional system does not offer them the possibility to meet their basic 
needs”  Jorn Sonderholm, “World Poverty and  Not  Respecting Individual  Freedom Enough.”  Journal  of  Philosophical  
Research 36 (2011):  214-215.  The power of this passage seems to me to come from the fact that “because” has a causal 
connotation but there is no causal link at issue in WPIF’s argument. What has to be the case is that there are at least some  
people the global institutional system subjects to coercive rule who cannot meet their needs. Moreover, it is not clear why  
Sonderholm believes the fact that people are responsible for their plights entails that there is no obligation to aid them.
viii
 Nicole Hassoun, “World Poverty and Individual Freedom,” American Philosophical Quarterly 45, 2 (2008): 191-198.
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 Though, it does suggest that a negative-rights violation entails a positive duty.
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 See,  for  instance,  Jorn  Sonderholm,  “World  Poverty  and  Not  Respecting  Individual  Freedom  Enough.”  Journal  of  
Philosophical Research 36 (2011):  213 and 215. Sonderholm does suggest that showing that the global order is causing 
poverty would help to show that this order “makes it impossible for a substantial amount of people  to meet their basic 
needs.” Jorn Sonderholm, “World Poverty and Not Respecting Individual Freedom Enough.”  Journal of  Philosophical  
Research 36 (2011): 215. However, all that is required for WPIF’s argument is that there are at least some people subject to  
the global order who cannot meet their needs. See discussion in preceding notes on this point.
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 See,  for  instance:  Thomas  Pogge ,  World  Poverty  and  Human  Rights:  Cosmopolitan  Responsibilities  and  Reforms 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002).
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 For a nice argument for positive rights, see: James Nickel,  Making Sense of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006).
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 For examples of some WPIF might address who would deny the conclusion of its  argument,  see: Jan Narveson,  The 
Libertarian Idea (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998).
Also see: Tibor Machan. 2001. "The Perils of Positive Rights," The Freeman: Ideas on Liberty, 51. 
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 Recall, moreover, that the global order must make it possible for these people to secure what they need to do so. Nicole  
Hassoun, Globalization and Global Justice: Shrinking Distance, Expanding Obligations (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012a). Also see: Nicole Hassoun, “Freedom and Autonomy,” in  New Waves in Global Justice, ed. Thom Brooks 
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Global Justice.” Carnegie Mellon Working Paper. 2012b. Available at: http://www.hss.cmu.edu/philosophy/hassoun/faculty-
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Commitments.” Carnegie Mellon Working Paper. 2012c. Available at: http://www.hss.cmu.edu/philosophy/hassoun/faculty-
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xvii
 See, for instance: John Simmons, “Consent Theory for Libertarians,” Social Philosophy and Policy 22, 1 (2005): 331.
xviii
 At least  this  is  so as  long as  this coercion will  otherwise violate  their  basic libertarian rights  and the conditions for  
autonomy are  required  for  free  consent.  This  is  plausible  as  the  conditions  for  autonomy at  issue  in  WPIF (and  my 
subsequent work on this argument) are fairly minimal – they do not embody, e.g., a Kantian conception of reasoning. See: 
Nicole Hassoun, Globalization and  Global Justice: Shrinking Distance, Expanding Obligations. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012a). Also see: Nicole Hassoun, “Freedom and Autonomy,” in New Waves in Global Justice, ed. Thom 
Brooks  (Hampshire  and  New  York:  Palgrave  MacMillion,  forthcoming).  Finally,  see:  Nicole  Hassoun,  “Coercion, 
Legitimacy,  and  Global  Justice.”  Carnegie  Mellon  Working  Paper.  2012b.  Available  at: 
http://www.hss.cmu.edu/philosophy/hassoun/faculty-hassoun.php (the  later  were  originally  cited  in  WPIF  as  Hassoun, 
2008a and b).
xix
 Some exceptions to protect individuals’ autonomy or interests may be in order here.
xx
 There  are  independent  reasons  to  think  that  libertarians  will  reject  the  claim  that  we  can  coerce  even  potentially  
autonomous people just to protect their interests, but this claim is not ruled out by WPIF’s argument.
xxi
 Nicole Hassoun, “World Poverty and Individual Freedom,” American Philosophical Quarterly 45, 2 (2008): 191-198.
xxii
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University Press,  2012a).  Nicole Hassoun,  “Libertarian Welfare Rights?  The Coherence of Some Common Libertarian 
Commitments.” Carnegie Mellon Working Paper. 2012c. Available at: http://www.hss.cmu.edu/philosophy/hassoun/faculty-
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xxiii
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xxvii
 See, for instance: Richard Miller, “Cosmopolitan Respect and Patriotic Concern,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 27 (1998): 
202-24. Also see: Michael Blake, “Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 30 
(2001): 257-96. 
xxviii
 My book extends the argument in WPIF to address other liberals as well: Nicole Hassoun ,  Globalization and Global  
Justice: Shrinking Distance, Expanding Obligations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012a).
xxix
 Nicole Hassoun,  Globalization and Global Justice: Shrinking Distance, Expanding Obligations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012a). Also see: Nicole Hassoun, “Freedom and Autonomy,” in New Waves in Global Justice, ed. Thom 
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http://www.hss.cmu.edu/philosophy/hassoun/faculty-hassoun.php. The later papers were originally cited as working papers 
in WPIF as Hassoun, 2008a and b. 
xxx
 I extend my defense of the argument in WPIF in  several longer papers and my book Globalization and Global Justice. 
Hassoun, 2012a; Hassoun, forthcoming; Hassoun, 2012b (the later were originally cited in WPIF as Hassoun, 2008a and b). 
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 See preceding notes for discussion of validity.
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